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RANDOM TESTING OF PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES
ALAN C. PAGE*
Substance abuse among professional athletes is not a new
phenomenon. Athletes, not unlike the population at large, have
used and abused drugs and alcohol for years. Only within the
last eight to ten years, however, has substance abuse by players
become the subject of media attention. As a result, sports fans
and nonfans alike have leaped to the conclusion that a substance
abuse epidemic exists within the ranks of professional athletes.
Based on that conclusion, many people believe that if society can
cure the epidemic among professional athletes, it will have won
the war on drugs. In reality, neither conclusion is true. No
substance abuse epidemic is present in professional sports. Fur-
thermore, even if the "epidemic" is cured, it would not solve the
problems that create the need for the war on drugs.
First, no source has provided any hard data suggesting that
professional athletes either use or abuse drugs or alcohol at a
rate different from society at large. Second, there are not enough
professional athletes, let alone athletes, involved with substance
abuse to impact the war on drugs. The number of athletes
employed in the professional sports industry is limited. The
combined total of on-field personnel employed by the National
Football League, Major League Baseball, the National Basketball
Association, and the National Hockey League is less than 3000
individuals. Based on these figures, if every player in each of the
above-mentioned sports had a substance abuse problem, and we
were able to solve each player's problem, we would not be any
closer to a solution to our nation's substance abuse problems.
Simply put, whatever role professional athletes who use and/or
abuse drugs and alcohol play in our nation's substance abuse
problems, these athletes are barely the tip of the iceberg.
Given the high visibility of professional athletes, however, the
Task Force asked the question, "Should the Substance Abuse
Testing Act of 1991 authorize random drug and alcohol testing
for professional athletes?" After a short discussion of whether
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strong policy reasons exist for specifically including professional
athletes under the random testing provisions of the Act, the
Task Force concluded that authorizing random testing of profes-
sional athletes was not warranted. I concur in that decision.
Before drug and alcohol testing of any type (whether "for
cause" testing, random testing, after-prior-use testing, postacci-
dent testing, or applicant testing) should be permitted, an em-
ployer should have strong policy reasons for conducting such
testing. These policy reasons must outweigh the employee's or
applicant's privacy interests. The same holds true for legislation
authorizing drug and alcohol testing. Generally, the policy reasons
given to support random testing of professional athletes are as
follows: (1) fair competition; (2) public confidence in the games;
(3) high visiblity of athletes as role models; and (4) the health
and safety of the athletes. Under the circumstances that exist
today, these policy reasons are outweighed by the athlete's pri-
vacy interests and do not justify random testing. The notion of
privacy is fundamental. It is a notion that goes to the very core
of each individual's existence.
FAIR COMPETITION'
The fair competition issue is rooted in the belief that athletes
who use drugs to enhance their performance have an unfair
advantage over those individuals who do not. In fact, no one has
offered empirical evidence that supports the conclusion that those
who use drugs for competition actually improve their perform-
ance.2 As the evidence in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic
Associations suggests, performance enhancement drugs simply do
not work. This is the case for all known performance enhancement
drugs. At best, the evidence available to support the fair com-
petition argument is anecdotal. Such evidence should not form
the basis for governmental authorization of employer intrusion
into the privacy of employees. No factual predicate exists to
support the notion that drug and alcohol use by professional
athletes results in unfair competition. Without that factual pred-
1. For purposes of this discussion, I will assume that some legitimate governmental
interest in fair competition among professional athletes exists.
2. See discussion of evidence offered in support of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association's drug testing of intercollegiate athletes in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, 418-19 (Ct. App.), review granted. 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal. 1990).
Although the evidence in Hill related to intercollegiate athletes, no data is available to
suggest that circumstances are substantially different at the professional level.
3. Id.
[Vol. 33:155
RANDOM TESTING OF PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES
icate, government cannot justify authorization of random testing
based on the need to maintain fair competition.
THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE ATHLETES
Unlike airline pilots, doctors, teachers, and nuclear plant work-
ers, professional athletes are not specifically charged with the
responsibility of ensuring health and safety. Indeed, in profes-
sional football and hockey, which are inherently violent and
dangerous sports, some would suggest that concerns over drug
testing for health and safety reasons are misguided. Additionally,
misuse of anything from aspirin and beer to properly prescribed
medicine can have negative effects upon an individual's health.
Moreover, an individual participating in an athletic contest whose
physician has prescribed medication to mask the pain of previous
injuries is at the same or greater risk for injury than someone
on drugs or, alternatively, being hit by someone on drugs. 4 Yet
we do not permit random testing for such misuse in other
occupations, nor do we permit random testing of employees
generally. Therefore, we should not permit such testing of pro-
fessional athletes, for no evidence suggests that drug use plays
any role in on-field injury to players or their opponents.
Health and safety are issues that might justify a greater
intrusion into the individual's privacy interests. However, if ev-
idence is lacking to establish that professional athletes are at a
greater risk of illness or injury due to drug use than the popu-
lation at large, no basis arises for authorizing random testing
solely because the individuals involved happen to be professional
athletes.
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
Those individuals who purchase tickets, watch on television,
or are merely interested in professional sports have a right to
expect that the participants perform at the highest possible level
and that they do not engage in any fraud or deception with
repect to their performance. By the same token, those indivi-
4. By way of example, in the 1970 NFL championship game between the Cleveland
Browns and the Minnesota Vikings, a Browns defensive lineman, who had injured a hand
on a previous occasion, had the hand numbed with Novocaine in order to play in the
game. The temperature at game time was in the negative teens. The player almost lost
the fingers on his previously injured hand because the Novocaine did not allow him to
feel that his fingers were becoming frostbitten.
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duals who purchase new cars have the same expectations of the
workers who put the cars together. The difference between
professional athletes and auto workers in this regard is that we
do not seek to justify random drug and alcohol testing based on
the need for public confidence in the auto workers' performance.
Obviously, the public has a strong interest in the integrity of
the individuals participating in a given sport. This is a crucial
part of what gives a sport its value. Having a right to the
athlete's best performance and an interest in the integrity of
that performance does not, however, mean that the public's
interest outweighs the individual's privacy rights. When hiring
a lawyer, we have a right to expect the lawyer to perform at
the highest level of his or her ability and to carry out our legal
business with integrity. We have the same expectation when it
comes to stockbrokers and school teachers, yet we do not suggest
that people engaged in those occupations be subject to random
drug and alcohol testing. Public confidence in the people employed
in these occupations is as important, if not more so, as the need
for public confidence in professional sports.
In the sport of horse racing, at least one court has upheld the
random drug testing of jockeys.5 The underlying basis given by
the court for permitting random testing of jockeys was the need
to maintain public confidence in an industry based on gambling.6
Unlike most professional sports, horse racing is subject to heavy
governmental regulation. In that regard, it is similar to law,
medicine, business, and education. Most professional sports, on
the other hand, are subject to only minimal governmental regu-
lation. Although the concern in horse racing is legalized gambling,
most other professional sports do not involve such conduct. The
degree of integrity called for in the area of unregulated profes-
sional sports does not justify the intrusion into an individual
employee's privacy that would result from random drug and
alcohol testing.
ATHLETES AS HIGHLY VISIBLE ROLE MODELS
Some argue that because athletes are role models, they must
live up to higher standards than society at large. In fact, as
5. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
6. Id. at 1142. The court offered as a second rationale the jockey's awareness of
extensive preexisting regulations in the industry serving to maintain the public confidence.
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people, athletes are no different than others in society. Just
because one has the skills of a motor genius to fly through the
air like a bird on the way to the basket or to make contact with
a ninety-eight-mile-per-hour fastball does not mean that such
individuals are immune from or have any greater ability to deal
with the causes of substance abuse. We cannot realistically hold
athletes to a higher standard with respect to substance abuse
than those who are not so athletically gifted.
Many people, particularly young children, certainly look up to
athletes. When an athletic hero slips from grace because of
substance abuse, the question arises about the role that athletes
play in our society. Answering this question by saying that
athletes should play an important role and that it is therefore
justifiable to reduce or eliminate their individual rights is not
the right answer. We would be far better off by telling our
children that they can look up to many people, both in and out
of sports, who are not substance abusers. We would be better
off if we stopped glamorizing those athletes who engage in
substance abuse; furthermore, we could do a much better job
using those who have succumbed to substance abuse as negative
role models in positive ways. An appropriate solution would be
to stop making athletes larger-than-life heroes rather than to
deny individual athletes the basic and fundamental right to pri-
vacy. Having society's unrealistic view of professional athletes
override the individual's expectation of privacy solely because
they are athletes would be misguided. By deciding that employ-
ment in a high-visibility occupation allows us to intrude into the
individual's privacy, what group or occupation would be next?
CONCLUSION
As noted in the executive summary of the Task Force's pro-
posed act (the Act),7 decisionmakers should narrowly tailor an
employer's ability to screen randomly for drug and alcohol use.
The Act permits random testing in only three situations: (1) when
an employee occupies a job in which impairment could cause
catastrophic injury to the public; (2) when an entire plant, facility,
or operating unit has demonstrated a prior history of substance
abuse and injury resulting from employees coming to work im-
paired is highly probable; and (3) when the employment position
7. See A SUBSTANCE ABUSE TESTING ACT, executive summary at 9 (Task Force on the
Drug-Free Workplace, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, Proposed Official Draft 1991).
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involves activities directly connected to the interdiction, detec-
tion, punishment, or treatment of illegal drug use.8 Professional
athletes and professional athletics in general do not fall within
any of the above situations. Society's interest in subjecting pro-
fessional athletes to random drug testing is no higher than its
interest in subjecting attorneys, doctors, stockbrokers, or teach-
ers to such testing. We do not propose random testing for those
occupations, nor should we authorize it for professional athletes.
The Act, as proposed, provides adequate means, independent
of random testing, for professional sports franchises to address
concerns relating to employee substance abuse. The Act permits
"for cause" testing, after-prior-use testing, postaccident testing,
and applicant testing.9 In addition, the employer maintains the
ability to address employee actions suggestive of substance abuse
based on appraisals of employee conduct. These alternatives to
random testing are adequate to protect the employer's interests
in the professional athletic industry. As noted above, the notion
of privacy goes to the very core of the individual. Given the lack
of evidence supporting intrusion into the individual athlete's
privacy and the availability of less intrusive alternatives, random
testing is not justified and should not be permitted.
8. Id.
9. Id. S 6, at 20-24.
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